Comments to the CPPA’s Proposed Regulations
Pursuant to the Consumer Privacy Rights Act of 2020
August 23, 2022
Brian Soublet
The California Privacy Protection Agency
2101 Arena Blvd.
Sacramento, CA 95834
By email: regulations@cppa.ca.gov
I am a tenured law professor at Santa Clara University School of Law, where I teach Internet
Law and direct the school’s Privacy Law Certificate. These comments represent only my views
and not the views of my employer or any third party.
Section
7001(h)

Proposed Revisions
1) Change “significantly
outweighs” to “outweighs”
2) Change “the benefit
provided to the consumer” to
“the benefit to the consumer
(as documented by credible
evidence from the
consumer)”
3) Add “A business need not
consider any consumer
benefit that is not documented
by credible evidence or is
obviously pretextual.”
4) Delete everything after the
first sentence. If not, make
corresponding changes and
define “adequate.”

Explanation
Asking businesses to evaluate consumers’
benefits does not work. Businesses rarely know
or can confidently guess what benefits
consumers will idiosyncratically derive, and
consumer self-reports of their purported
“benefits” are unreliable and easily gamed.
Instead of adopting my suggestions, a better
approach would be to adopt a definition that
doesn’t depend on gauging consumer benefit at
all.

Section
7002(a)
7002(b)
7027(a)
7027(l)
7053(a)

7003(c)

Proposed Revisions
Replace “average” consumer
with “reasonable” consumer

Replace “other” with “the
smallest text-based”

7004(a)(2) 1) Replace “symmetry” with
“similarity”
2) Replace “shall not be
longer” with “shall not
require consumers to take
more steps or actions”
3) In subpart (D), delete
“more prominent (i.e.,” the
end parenthesis, and “is not
symmetrical”

Explanation
The CADOJ proposed the “average consumer”
phrase in its initial draft of the CCPA
regulations, but then it backtracked when it
recognized the error of its ways. It’s unfortunate
that this phrase has been resurrected. As I wrote
in response to the initial regulations:
“The ‘average consumer’ standard does not
represent the prevailing national approach in
consumer protection law. The FTC expressly
considered the appropriate standard for
measuring consumer confusion in its 1983 Policy
Statement on Deception. In that statement, the
FTC adopted the standard of ‘a consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances.’ This standard
has served consumers and the FTC well for over
three decades. Among other advantages, it
avoids the indeterminacy of defining what
constitutes an ‘average’ consumer when a
business caters to multiple heterogeneous
consumer segments.”
Websites contain links in a variety of formats
(such as text, images, and buttons) and sizes. The
proposed regulation incorrectly assumes a single
standard for how links are presented.
“Symmetry” implies “equality,” but it’s
impossible to promote two items “equally” on a
web page. By definition, one option must always
be to the left of, or above, other options. Subpart
(D) similarly assumes that options can have
equal prominence.
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Section
Proposed Revisions
7004(a)(4) 1) Define “choice
architecture”
2) Delete the “guilt or shame”
and “manipulative and
shaming” standard
3) Define “bundles consent”

7004(a)(5) 1) Define “unnecessary
burden or friction”
2) Define “aggressive filters”
3) Define “unnecessarily
wait”
7004(b)
Reconsider the definition of
“dark pattern” and possibly
define “user interfaces”

Explanation
The terms “choice architecture” and “bundled
consent” are jargon.
The proposed restrictions on “guilting” and
“shaming” are improper. Businesses cannot
control or always anticipate consumers’
subjective feelings. Furthermore, all persuasive
material, including advertising, necessarily
prompts consumers to think about and secondguess their choices. The regulation essentially
equates standard marketing techniques with
“guilting” or “shaming” techniques. Thus, the
proposed standard is both indeterminate on the
businesses’ side and overinclusive on the
enforcement side. Standard false advertising
principles of deception and unfairness can
sufficiently police any abusive business practices
in this situation.
These terms are jargon.

The CPRA authorizes the CPPA to define “dark
patterns” only with respect to “user interfaces.”
The statute does not define “user interface,” but
typically the term includes only actual
“interfaces,” not every aspect of a business’
goods/service or operations. Parts of 7004(a)
seem likely to reach beyond “user interfaces,”
such as restrictions on a product’s “choice
architecture” (whatever that jargon means). The
CPPA should reevaluate if its definition of “dark
patterns” stays within the scope of its authority.
It may also be worth defining “user interface” to
self-impose boundaries on the scope of dark
patterns.
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Section
7012(f)

7015(b)

Proposed Revisions
Delete the last sentence

Explanation
Deep-linking is not always possible due to
technological constraints. The requirement also
assumes that a disclosure will fully address the
applicable topic in a single place, but consumers
often need to read the entire disclosure
(including definitions, disclaimers, exceptions,
and more) to properly understand any specific
provision. In those cases, deeplinking will hinder
consumer understanding. Also, businesses do not
control the displays on consumers’ devices, so
scrolling may be required even if a business uses
deeplinking.
Replace “any other” with “the Businesses will use many different-sized icons
smallest”
on their website. It would not be proper to
require businesses to make this opt-out icon as
large as the largest icon on the page. That would
clutter up pages, would not be scalable if other
regulators took the same position, and would
disrupt the businesses’ abilities to maximize the
page’s helpfulness to consumers.
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Section
7023

Proposed Revisions
1) In (b), replace “determines
that the contested personal
information is more likely
than not accurate based on the
totality of the circumstances”
with “has a reason to believe
that the requested correction
may not be accurate”
2) Delete (b)(2)
3) Delete (d)(2)(D) or make
changes similar to those
mentioned in 7001(h)
4) In part (f), add an
immunity for the explanations
5) In part (f), add a qualifier
that businesses are required to
append information to a
record only when their
database software is designed
to accommodate that
function.
6) In part (f), add the
following: “No explanations
are required where
disclosures would expose
trade secrets, put the business
at a competitive disadvantage,
or increase the business’ risk
of exposure to consumers’
attempts to undermine its
policies or offerings.”
7) Similar qualifications
should be made to part (i).
8) In part (g), delete “within
the past six months of
receiving the request.”

Explanation
The proposed correction process does not follow
good information governance practices. It
requires businesses to “adjudicate” the truth of
disputed information—but skews the businesses’
incentives towards accepting the consumer’s
assertions even when the consumer may be
wrong or lying. Thus, the proposed regulation
facilitates the collection and propagation of
inaccurate information.
The proposed regulation stacks the decks in
favor of inaccurate information. First, it says the
business must accept the correction even if it has
49% doubt about the veracity. Second, it puts the
burden on businesses to document and explain
why they think a consumer’s correction request
is fraudulent or abusive. Together, these burdens
(and the associated legal risk) pushes businesses
towards acquiescing to consumer correction
requests, even when the business has substantial
doubts about the correction’s veracity.
When consumers manipulate these burdens to
force improper corrections, it harms everyone.
The corrected information will be relied upon by
other businesses, and consumers can weaponize
the undeserved trust in data quality to commit
fraud or perpetrate public deceptions. This also
puts the business at risk of legal liability if they
are sharing false information that consumers
forced into their databases.
The explanations requirement further nudges
businesses towards accepting improper
corrections. By definition, this issue will arise
only when the facts are contested, which means
the businesses are already unsure of what’s the
“truth.” Then, if businesses reject the correction,
they will fear liability for whatever they disclose
in the explanations (see, e.g., Isaac v. Twitter,
Inc., 557 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2021))—
another liability risk they can avoid by
acquiescing. To avoid the pro-inaccuracy
implications of the explanations liability, the
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regulations should provide an immunity from
liability for these disclosures.
Explanations may also enable consumers to
engage in adversarial behavior, such as gaming
the business’ policies/systems or exposing trade
secrets. Explanations should not be required
where those consequences are possible.
Appending information to records should be
required only when a business’ database
software facilitates it. Otherwise, this
requirement may impose disproportionate costs
on businesses because they will have to change
databases to accommodate the requirement.
Part (d)(2)(D) makes the same error as 7001(h).
Businesses cannot assess the idiosyncratic
impacts on consumers unless the impact has been
credibly documented to them.
Part (g) seems to authorize a consumer to
reargue the exact same issue 2x/year in
perpetuity, with all of the associated costs. That
doesn’t serve anyone’s interests.
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Section
7025

Proposed Revisions
Add a certification process
before any technology is
legally designated as an optout preference signal, and add
a phase-in period for
businesses to accommodate
the designation

7025(g)(2) Delete part (C)

7060(b)

Delete

7062(d)

Delete “or correction of the
spelling of a name”

Explanation
As ridiculous as it was for the California
Attorney General to tweet that the CADOJ
considered the Global Privacy Control to be a
qualifying opt-out signal, the tweet at least
provided guidance to the business community
about the department’s views. Without that
tweet, businesses would otherwise have to guess
what technologies qualify because the
regulations do not provide any other official
signals to businesses. The CPPA should develop
a process for validating software that meets the
regulatory standards, publicize its determination
to the community, and give businesses an
adequate period to make the technical
adjustments on their side. Even tweets from the
CPPA would be more helpful than the current
proposed regulation.
This provision has unintended consequences.
Effectively, it requires a business to encourage
consumers to adopt opt-out preference signals to
communicate directly with it, but the consumer’s
adoption of an opt-out preference signal will
affect the consumer’s relationships with all
businesses, not just the one business in question.
In other words, a consumer’s decision to adopt
an opt-out preference signal just to interact with
one business will have a much broader and
potentially unwanted and unanticipatable effects.
The proposed regulation implicitly encourages
consumers to make this consequential choice
with incomplete information.
The regulations proceed on the assumption that
opt-outs or requests to limits will always be in
the consumers’ interests, but in fact they are
weaponizable by adversaries like the other
CPRA’s consumer rights. Thus, these requests
should be authenticated as well.
Name corrections are a vector of attack for
identity theft.
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Section
7102

Proposed Revisions
Delete

Explanation
If the CPPA wants to continue this non-statutory
requirement, it should provide empirical
justification that the transparency reports benefit
anyone. I am unaware of any such empirical
support. The initial statements of reasons makes
an unsupported empirical claim that the
disclosures are “necessary to inform the Agency,
Attorney General, policymakers, academics, and
members of the public about businesses’
compliance with the CCPA.” I trust the Agency
would make that empirical claim only if it had
substantial evidence demonstrating that necessity
based on actual in-the-field data since the
existing requirement has been in effect. Many
people, including me, would like to see the
Agency’s supporting evidence. Until then, the
public evidence to date vitiates the purported
“necessity” because the initial batch of
transparency reports appeared to be useless. See,
e.g. Susannah Luthi, 'Functionally Useless':
California Privacy Law's Big Reveal Falls Short,
POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2021). The likely failure of
these disclosures aren’t surprising; there is an
extensive literature on why mandatory
disclosures fail. E.g. ARCHON FUNG, MARY
GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY
(2007); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
(2014). Failure is virtually guaranteed when a
regulator doesn’t follow best practices in
structuring mandatory disclosure requirements
(which the CADOJ did not do). Until it can
provide empirical proof of the purported
“necessity,” the CPPA should abandon this
section as a failed regulatory experiment.
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Section
7304

Proposed Revisions
Add a requirement that any
audit is authorized only when
the Agency complies with
applicable legal process

Explanation
The CPPA has a wide range of investigatory
tools available to it, including information
demands, administrative subpoenas, and court
orders. The regulations should specify that any
“audit” is permitted only after the CPPA has
followed the appropriate legal process associated
with the information the CPPA seeks to obtain.
Any lesser standard exceeds the CPPA’s legal
authority and raises major constitutional
problems.
With respect to ensuring recidivist
noncompliance, the CPPA can include audit
rights in any settlement or consent order. No
regulation is required to implement that.

Two other points beyond the proposed regulations:
First, the CPPA has already missed its statutory deadline for completing the rule-making process,
and this delay ensures that businesses will not get an appropriate and fair turnaround time to
implement the regulations. The CPPA should provide explicit guidance on an updated schedule
for businesses’ expected compliance obligations and the CPPA’s enforcement efforts.
Second, the statement of financial impact raises several red flags about how the CPPA is
justifying its regulations, including:






The supporting economic report (which did not include the authoring firm’s name, a
perhaps prudent decision given its problems) excluded businesses that are GDPR“compliant” from its calculations.* Why? The CPPA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
expressly acknowledges “key differences between the GDPR and CCPA, especially in
terms of how personal information is defined and the consumer’s right to opt-out of the
sale or sharing of personal information (which is not required in the GDPR).” Given the
CPPA’s position about the dissimilarities of the CCPA and GDPR, it is contradictory for
the CPPA’s economic report to treat GDPR “compliance” as part of the regulatory
baseline. Indeed, it raises questions about how the CPPA could accept the report with
such a critical (and obvious) conflict with the CPPA’s own positions.
Section B(3) of the statement of financial impact estimates that reporting businesses will
incur $2.8M in annual compliance costs. Yet, the statement of financial impact also
estimates lifetime compliance with the regulations will cost $8M total. The CPPA should
explain these apparent discrepancies.
The economic report’s estimate that it will take businesses 1.5 hours of compliance with
the new regulations is not credible. It’s not possible to read and understand the 29,000+

I do not know any privacy practitioner who would say that a company can be GDPR-“compliant” due to the
ongoing and indeterminate nature of the GDPR’s requirements.
*
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words in the proposed regulations in 1.5 hours,** let alone actually interpret them, make
judgments about which regulations require changes, and then implement those changes.
As just one of dozens of possible unaccounted-for costs, businesses may need new
software to accommodate the correction appending requirements, with associated (and
potentially substantial) acquisition, migration, and training costs. I do not understand how
the economic consultant failed to model that scenario. The failure to properly account for
the true economic consequences of the proposed regulations raises obvious questions
about whether this rule-making process complies with California law.
Thank you for considering my comments.

Professor Eric Goldman
Associate Dean for Research
Co-Director, High Tech Law Institute
Supervisor, Privacy Law Certificate
Santa Clara University School of Law
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
408-554-4369
egoldman@gmail.com
http://www.ericgoldman.org
http://twitter.com/ericgoldman

**

If a reader could maintain an average reading speed of 250 words per minute, the regulations would take about 2
hours to read.
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